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Abstract
I decompose the variance of earnings of Finnish male and female work-
ers to its permanent and transitory components using the approach of
Baker (1997) and Haider (2001). I find that the increasing earnings in-
equality of men and women is driven by both transitory and permanent
components of earnings. In addition, I find considerable differences in
earnings dynamics between men and women that have been largely ne-
glected in previous studies of earnings dynamics. The inequality among
men is dominated by the permanent component. Conversely, permanent
and transitory components are of comparable magnitudes to women. As
a corollary, men face more stable income paths but with larger perma-
nent earnings differences. Women, on the other hand, face more unstable
earnings profiles but have smaller permanent differences in earnings. The
correlation between initial earnings inequality and its growth is found to
be positive for both sexes, implying a divergence of earnings profiles to-
wards end of the working career. In addition, earnings instability has risen
for both sexes.
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1 Introduction
Growing earnings inequality has been a common phenomenon in most of the
developed countries since the 1970s. The need to understand this phenomenon
has spurred a great deal of research.
Traditional studies of earnings inequality in Finland as well as in other coun-
tries have concentrated on measuring cross-sectional earnings inequality and
its year-to-year changes. Concentrating on cross-sectional inequality hides an
important element of economic inequality, namely the mobility of individuals
within the earnings distribution.
More recent studies on earnings dynamics stress the importance of decom-
posing earnings inequality into permanent and transitory components. These
two components have a different impact on long run income differences and
consequently have different welfare implications. If the rise in yearly income
inequality is driven by the transitory component, it may suggest that earnings
have become more risky. This, in turn, may decrease welfare if individuals are
not able to completely smooth out income fluctuations. This might happen if
earnings shocks are either very large or very persistent. On the other hand, if
the rise in yearly income inequality is due to the changes in returns to educa-
tion or other fixed worker attributes, it implies an increased inequality in career
earnings as well. If the yearly income inequality is driven by the transitory
component, we should observe more year-to-year mobility within the income
distribution. This leads to an increase of inequality in the short term but not in
the long run. If the permanent component dominates the transitory, it implies
that low earnings are a permanent rather than an isolated experience.
Examples of factors contributing to permanent component of earnings in-
clude changes in returns to education, skill, on-the-job training, or other factors
that are relatively fixed from the point of view of an individual worker.1
In this paper, I decompose year-to-year variance of earnings into permanent
and transitory components and study their evolution over time by fitting an error
component model to observed second moments of individual earnings processes
using Finnish data. My data are based on filed tax reports, so measurement
errors due to misreporting are arguably substantially smaller than in survey-
based approaches.
The vast majority of existing studies decomposing earnings inequality into
transitory and permanent components only concentrates on males, making the
implicit assumption that the earnings inequality of male workers is a good mea-
sure for overall earnings inequality.2 The main contribution of this paper to
existing literature is that I present measures of permanent and transitory com-
ponents of earnings separately for men and women. This echoes the observations
of Korkeamäki & Kyyrä (2006), who uses Finnish data and finds substantial
differences in fields of education between men and women and also substantial
segregation of occupations and firms into those dominated by males and those
1It should be stressed that income volatility may or may not be equivalent to economic risk.
As discussed in Blundell et al. (2008), earnings volatility does not necessarily translate into
changes in welfare. Whether changes in earninigs volatility have welfare implications depends
on whether changes are anticipated and whether individuals are able to insure themselves
against the instability of earnings.
2A notable exception is Ziliak et al. (2011), who reports measures of permanent and
transitory earnings inequality separately for men and women as well as different educational
groups, but does not limit their study to employed people.
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by females. Consequently, the picture of earnings inequality based only on males
might be misleading. To get comparable figures for men and women, I limit my
sample to working males and females and compare their earnings dynamics. Fi-
nally, my earnings data spans years 1988-2007, allowing me to study relatively
recent developments of earnings dynamics.
The current paper is a heavily influenced by a series of papers studying
earnings dynamics in other countries. Pioneering studies in this field include
Gottschalk & Moffitt (1994), Moffitt & Gottschalk (2002), Baker (1997), and
Haider (2001), all of which have been highly influential in studying earnings dy-
namics in the U.S. by applying GMM estimation techniques. Following in their
footsteps, Baker & Solon (2003) and Dickens (2000) present a similar decompo-
sition for Canada and the U.K., respectively. Due to the larger data they have
at their disposal, they are able to fit considerably more general models than the
ones based on U.S. data. More recent papers using European registry based data
fit variants of Baker & Solon (2003) and Dickens (2000). These include Gus-
tavsson (2008), who studies a long Swedish panel from 1960 to 1990 and Ramos
(2003) who studies British earnings data from the 1990s and Cappellari (2004),
who studies Italian earnings data between 1970s and 1990s. Even though the
exact model specifications as well as time periods under consideration vary from
country to country, the general finding is that there are significant differences
between countries in terms of earnings dynamics. This motivates replicating
the analysis using data from a new country. This paper is a scientific repli-
cation study (using the terminology of Hamermesh 2007): it applies a rather
well-established model to a new data.
As a preview of the results, it turns out that increasing earnings inequality is
driven by both, permanent and transitory components, but their contribution is
different for men and for women. For men, permanent inequality dominates the
transitory inequality. For women, they are of similar magnitude. In addition,
permanent earnings differences vary substantially between cohorts. Male co-
horts are more equal in terms of their permanent earnings compared to women.
There has also been a trend increase in earnings instability of both sexes during
the observation period.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the
sample selection criteria. Section 3 introduces the model of earnings dynamics
and outlines the estimation method. Section 4 provides results and visualizes
them. Section 5 offers conclusions.
2 Data and sample construction
The data consists of a panel of a one-third random sample of Finnish census. It
covers the years 1988-2007.
The measure of earnings used in this paper is yearly annual gross income.
Earnings are calculated from individual tax files. To ensure comparability be-
tween years, all earnings are deflated to EUR 2007 using the Consumer Price
Index. By definition, yearly earnings are given by hourly wage multiplied by
the hours worked. Therefore, earnings inequality reflects two dimensions of in-
equality, inequality in wages and inequality in hours worked. Consequently, the
variance of yearly earnings is higher than the variance of hourly wages unless
the covariance of wages and hours worked is negative and large Abowd & Card
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1989.
My measure of earnings inequality is the variance of log yearly labour earn-
ings. This is the standard in papers studying earnings dynamics. The motiva-
tion for this is that the mathematical properties of variance are well established.
In addition, the correlation between the variance of log earnings and other widely
used inequality measures is very high. The downside of this choice is that it
is not measure-free. Thus, the choice of currency units and base year affects
the measure of total earnings inequality. Nonetheless, the measure only affects
the level of inequality, but not the changes. Moreover, the decomposition into
permanent and transitory components is unaffected by the measure.
Registry data has some advantages over survey data. Since earnings infor-
mation is collected as a part of the administrative process, non-response and
incorrect answers can be ruled out resulting in extremely reliable data on earn-
ings.3 Attrition from the data can happen only by migration or death. A
possible caveat of using a long time series derived from tax registries is that
variable definitions may vary over time. Even though the definition of total
taxable income has changed as tax laws have changed during the period of
1988-2007, the definition of taxable labour earnings has remained stable.
Concentrating only on work earnings naturally hides some of the income
differences prevalent in the society, because the total income of individuals is
defined as a sum of earnings, capital income, income transfers recieved and taxes
paid. Supplementing the data by including capital incomes is not feasible due
to limited data. Moreover, including income transfers and paid taxes would
introduce problems because changes in tax laws and social security eligibility
rules would severely limit the length of the panel. Another reason to prefer the
measure of income chosen in this paper is that it is broadly equivalent to other
papers published, thus facilitating international comparisons.
Another minor caveat in the data for the purposes of this paper is that
earnings of over 200,000 Euros are top-coded due to statistical secrecy laws.
This group is small (between .01 % and .05% of yearly observations), so their
effect to estimates is arguably small.
2.1 Sample selection criteria
The sample selection criteria are adopted from Haider (2001). The motivation
for these criteria is to ensure that earnings dynamics of people who are working
are not confounded by people who are switching between work and non-work.
The target group in my sample is prime age working males and females aged
between 26 and 60 who are observed for at least six years. I assume that by age
26, people have mostly finished their educations.
I include person-year observations only if the main type of activity of a
person is “working”. In other words, I exclude students, the unemployed, the
retired, and other people outside of workforce. I limit my attention to people
who are working because my interest is in earnings dynamics of people who are
consistently above the extensive margin. I also exclude working people with
zero yearly earnings because these observations are likely misclassified.
3Gottschalk & Huynh (2010) show that earnings inequality decompositions based on PSID
most likely overstate both earnings mobility and earnings inequality because of non-classical
measurement errors.
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After applying the sample selection criteria, I am left with a ”revolving un-
balanced panel” (following the terminology in Haider 2001). The panel is unbal-
anced because all cohorts are not observed for all years. The length of the panel
varies between 6 and 20 years, depending on the cohort. Using an unbalanced
panel breaks the collinearity between year, age, and cohort effects, making it
possible to identify all of them separately. Since people are included only if they
fulfill the criteria of selection, they may enter and exit the panel. This feature
makes the panel revolving. Applying a revolving unbalanced panel mitigates
problems related to compositional changes in the workforce related to the busi-
ness cycle. If workers with unstable earnings only enter the workforce during
an economic boom, they are only included in the data for those years, for which
other selection criteria are fulfilled.
Since it might be likely that individuals with very volatile earnings are also
more likely to permanently exit the panel, the approach chosen here introduces
potential bias to the estimates. Correcting for attrition is not feasible because
the data lacks instruments for selection. Still, the approach chosen here is less
restrictive than analyses based on fully balanced panels. In addition, including
only people with no breaks in their earnings histories would probably overstate
the contribution of permanent earnings component.
Previous papers studying the covariance structure of earnings concentrate
only on males. The underlying assumption for this is, that the labour force
participation of men is more or less constant whereas female labour force par-
ticipation is jointly determined with family decisions (e.g. fertility), which may
affect the estimation. Using the revolving balanced panel partially mitigates this
problem, because only observations from working years are included. Therefore,
transitions from in and out of the workforce do not contribute to the empirical
estimation. Nonetheless, it might be be the case, that working hours of fe-
males vary more than that of males, which may be reflected in female earnings
variances. I addition, it is well established both theoretically and empirically
(see, e.g., Eckstein & Wolpin 1989; Euwals et al. 2011 ) that a large negative
earnings shock may promote female fertility decisions. Fertility decisions might
then lower female wages due to their effect on work experience of women. This
mechanism introduces specific kind of selectivity issue: women with high earn-
ings shocks may voluntarily drop out of workforce and concentrate on home
production.4 Notwithstanding these caveats, the data should be representative
of those women who are constantly above the extensive margin. Furthermore,
the labor force participation rate of Finnish women is very high Pissarides et al.
2003, which means that endogenous participation of women is less of a problem
than in some other countries.
The revolving balanced panel structure ensures that the earnings inequality
measure in this paper reflects the true earnings inequality of the population
with good attachment to the labour market who are constantly above the ex-
tensive margin. Even though sample selection criteria somewhat differ from
other studies due to different structure of data used, they are consistent within
the observation period, thus enabling comparisons between years. Comparisons
between countries, on the other hand, might be subject to criticism.
I categorize people in two year birth cohorts and follow each cohort through
4It should be noted, that a similar mechanism might be present for male workers too: a
large negative earnings shock may induce people to drop out of workforce.
5
time. Studies based on smaller data have been forced to pool all cohorts together
due to small sample sizes. This naturally hides some of the heterogeneity of
earnings dynamics between cohorts. The total size of the sample used in the
analysis is given in Table 1.
2.2 Covariance structure of earnings by cohort
In Figure 1, I plot the observed earnings variance for workers selected by the
selection criteria given above. For both sexes, the variance decreases between
years 1988-1991, and thereafter it goes up until it peaks around 1994. After
1994 earnings inequality goes down somewhat but remains high until the end of
the sample period. The variances plotted in Figure 1 are somewhat higher than
those observed in most other similar studies. This might be because I cannot
discriminate between full-time and part-time workers. Moreover, in studies
based on filed income tax reports, earnings are censored from below, because
income below the tax limit is not observed. This is not the case in this paper.
To grasp the essential features of earnings dynamics, it is useful to inspect
the autocorrelation profiles of earnings by year and cohort. I have calculated
yearly variance as well as autocovariances between years for people who are
observed in both years. For cohorts which are observed for the full twenty
years this adds up to 21 × 20/2 = 210 unique covariance elements and less for
other cohorts. In total, unique elements of covariance matrices add up to 3,066
covariance elements.
Figure 2 presents the yearly variances and covariances between yearly earn-
ings for selected cohorts of men and women. Figure 2 demonstrates that there
are substantial differences in variances as well as autocovariances of male and
female earnings. This suggests that there are considerable differences in earn-
ings dynamics of men and women, making it reasonable to estimate separate
models for men and women. In addition, comparison of years reveals strong year
effects. These are especially apparent during the recession of the early 1990s.
The difference of variance and first autocovariance is relatively large. In addi-
tion, autocovariances remain positive even at long lags, indicating that there
are considerable permanent earnings differences. Finally, the variance and the
autocovariance values are larger for the oldest cohort even at longer lags, which
suggests the presence of cohort effects in permanent component of earnings.
An alternative way to study cohort covariances is to keep the year fixed
and plot covariances by age. This is done for three selected years in Figure 3.
Comparing years reveals that income variances and covariances have risen with
time for men as well as for women, which indicates that earnings inequality has
increased during the panel time and at least part of this rise is due to rise in
permanent earnings differences. The variances are higher for young women than
for young men, but as people grow older, the higher growth in variances of male
earnings causes men to overtake women in terms of earnings inequality. The
difference between the variance and autocovariances of earnings is at its largest
for young women, indicating that high earnings inequality of young women is
driven by transitory differences. For men, the difference between variance and
covariances remains almost constant with respect to age.
To summarize, in addition to being able to disentangle permanent and transi-
tory income differences, the preferred model for earnings inequality should allow
cohort as well as year effects. The model should also allow for the variances of
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permanent and transitory components to change as people age.
3 Model and estimation
In this section, I introduce the econometric model and the estimation method-
ology. I estimate an error-components model with permanent and transitory
variance components. The model allows individuals to permanently differ in
their mean earnings as well as the earnings growth rate. The transitory com-
ponent is modeled as an AR(1) process. As a result, even transitory shocks
are allowed to exhibit persistence and consequently take more than one year to
dampen out.
3.1 Econometric model
Let Yibt denote log earnings in year t of person i born in year b. Individual
earnings can be expressed as deviations from means, or
Yibt = µbt + yibt.
Since my interest lies in the second moments of the distribution of Yibt, it
suffices to write a model for de-meaned wages yibt. Expressing µbt as cohort-age
means captures average year, age, and cohort effects in a more flexible fashion
than using regression models with cohort-specific polynomials. The simplest
possible model for yibt is
yibt = ptαibt + λtεibt (1)
where the two are orthogonal to each other. Equation (1) can be seen as a
Mincerian earnings equation of relative earnings, where αibt stands for the ob-
served characteristics of individuals and εibt is the error term. pt and λt are
year-specific factor loadings. Applying variance operator to both sides yields
var (yibt) = p
2
tσ
2
α + λ
2
tσ
2
ε . (2)
Equation (2) gives the basic intuition of variance decomposition. ptσ2α denotes
the variance of the permanent component of earnings, and λtσ2ε denotes the
variance of the transitory component. An increase in either component increases
the dispersion of earnings, but an increase in λtσ2ε also implies that churning
within the earnings distribution increases.
Even though Equation (2) is intuitive, it may be too restrictive for two
reasons. First, the variance of transitory shocks may exhibit age-related het-
eroskedasticity because workers in the start of their careers may have more
unstable earnings.5 In addition, different cohorts may have different skills or
other characteristics that affect the variability of their earnings. To incorporate
these features, the following generalization of Equation (1) is used
yibt = qcptuibt + εibt, (3)
where
5Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) report significant heteroskedasticity in earnings instability
using U.S. data, albeit using a different model. Baker & Solon (2003) and Gustavsson (2008)
reach similar conclusions using Canadian and Swedish data, respectively.
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uibt = αi + βix, (4)
εibt = ρεibt−1 + λtνibt, (5)
where αi, βi and νi are random variables with distributions:[
αi
βi
]
∼
([
α¯
β¯
]
,
[
σ2α σαβ
σ2β
])
(6)
and
νibt ∼
(
ν¯, γ0 + γ1x+ γ2x
2
)
. (7)
x is defined as the potential experience of each cohort in year t, i.e., x = t−b−26.
In Equation (4) uibt is a random growth term. It describes the permanent
component of earnings. σ2α reflects variance of earnings profiles of individuals
at the age of 26, and the variance in σ2β reflects the deviation of individual-
specific growth rate from the average growth rate of each cohort (the average
growth rate is captured in µbt). pt and qc are year and cohort factor loadings,
respectively.
The transitory component of earnings in (5) is given by a mean-reverting
AR(1) process. λt are year-specific factor loadings on the innovation νibt.
This specification assumes that an earnings shock takes more than one year
to dampen out and that earnings shocks accumulate over time. In addition,
Equation (7) allows transitory variance to be a quadratic function of age. Tran-
sitory and permanent components of earnings are assumed to be orthogonal to
one another. To make identification possible, I have normalized p1988 and λ1989
and q1951−1952 to 1.
Equations (3)–(7) generate non-stationarity to the variances of earnings pro-
cesses through time-varying factor loadings for the permanent and the transitory
components, pt and λt. Another source of non-stationarity is the polynomial
form of the variance of transitory shocks. The intuition remains the same: a
rise in pt or qc increases permanent inequality of workers, whereas a rise in λt
increases the shuﬄing of workers.
In line with the model specifications in Baker & Solon (2003) and Gustavs-
son (2008), the polynomial form of var(νibt) recognizes that earnings instability
may vary between individuals because they are at different stages of their ca-
reers. Yearly factor loadings for permanent and transitory components also give
insights in to forces driving changes in income distribution.
The motivation of formulation in Equation (4) is both theoretical and em-
pirical. It has been successfully applied in, e.g., Haider (2001), Ramos (2003),
and Cappellari (2004) who demonstrate that in addition to allowing hetero-
geneity in mean earnings, the slope of earnings and the covariance of the two
are important in capturing the dynamics of earnings. In most previous studies,
the covariance term σαβ is found to be negative. This is consistent with the
on-the-job training hypothesis (see, e.g., Lillard & Weiss 1979; Hause 1980; and
Baker 1997), which states that individuals may accept lower earnings in the
beginning of their career, since they anticipate that their earnings will rise at a
high enough rate and for a long enough time that they will be compensated for
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the low earnings at the beginning of their career. On the other hand, if σαβ is
found to be positive, it is consistent with a schooling-matching hypothesis, in
which more skilled workers are endowed with more education, which raises their
initial earnings and face faster earnings growth as the quality of the match is
revealed to their employers (Cappellari, 2004).
In addition to the specification in Equations (3)–(7) usually known as “ran-
dom growth specification” I have also experimented with other specifications.
Particularly, another widely used specification for the permanent component is
the so-called “random walk specification” (e.g., Gustavsson 2008). This model
is given by uibt = uibt−1 + ξit, where ξit is a white noise process. The main
difference between the two formulations is that the random growth specification
allows the correlation of the intercept and slope terms to be nonzero, whereas
the random walk specification does not. In this sense, the random growth spec-
ification nests the random walk specification. Trials with the random growth
specification always resulted in a statistically significant estimate for σαβ . I in-
terpret this as a sign that a random walk model is inconsistent with the observed
covariance structure of earnings.
Random walk and random growth specifications have different implications
in terms of age-derivative of cross-sectional variances. Under the random walk
specification, the variance of earnings increases linearly with age, whereas under
the random growth specification, the growth of permanent earnings inequality
is either convex or concave, depending on the sign of σαβ Guvenen 2009.6
3.2 Estimation
Direct estimation of a model based on equations (3)-(7) is inefficient because
it means estimating αi and βi for each individual with only a small number of
observations. Since I am interested in the second moments of earnings distribu-
tion, I estimate them directly. To accomplish this, I write down the variance of
earnings on year t for cohort b implied by (3):
Var (yibt) = q
2
cp
2
t
[
σ2α + x
2σ2β + 2xσαβ
]
+
ρ2var (εibt−1) + λ2t var (νibt) . (8)
Respectively, a general covariance element between year t earnings and year
t− h (h > 0) earnings is given by7
Cov (yibt, yibt−h) = q2cptpt−h
[
σ2α + x(x− h)σ2β + (2x− h)σαβ
]
+ρhvar (εibt−h) . (9)
The term var (εibt) is calculated by backtracking the recursion in Equation
(5) until the first sample year of each cohort. Since earnings time series are
relatively short, consequent covariances depend on the variance of initial shock.
This flaws the standard time series analysis assumption of zero initial shocks. I
6Since random walk and random growth specifications do not necessarily rule each other
out, some researchers (e.g. Baker & Solon 2003 and Ramos 2003) incorporate both into the
same model. In my data, this specification either does not converge or results in negative
variance estimates. Furthermore, the interpretation of these specifications is hardly clear.
7Identification of earnings instability is made possible only by the off-diagonal elements of
the covariance matrix. Intuition for this that a high correlation between earnings at t and
earnings at t− h implies that instability is low and vice versa.
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follow suggestions of MaCurdy (1982; 2007) and treat the variances of initial
shocks as extra parameters to be estimated. This parameter also takes into
account the earnings differences accumulated before the start of sample.8
Since the panel is revolving, an individual can only contribute to the covari-
ance matrix if he or she is observed in years t and t−h. The sample covariances
are thus calculated as the earnings covariance of people who are observed in
both years. Consequently, people who have a higher attachment to the labor
market contribute more to the empirical covariance matrices, which leads to a
sample selection problem of some degree, that cannot be completely overcome
by unbalanced revolving panel construction. This is a common caveat in papers
of this genre.
The estimation boils down to minimizing the distance between cohort earn-
ings covariances implied by the model and the empirical autocovariances calcu-
lated from the data. I stack each unique covariance matrix elements into vector
C. Estimation is done by GMM, i.e., by minimizing the distance between ob-
served autocovariances C and those implied by the model F (θ) , where θ is a
vector of 87 parameters to be estimated. In practice, I minimize the standard
GMM criterion function
H = [C− F (θ)]′W [C− F (θ)] . (10)
Altonji & Segal (1996) demonstrate that using the asymptotically optimal
GMM weighting matrix, i.e., choosing W =
[
F (θ)
′
F (θ)
]−1
, can lead to very
large finite-sample bias. This is due to correlation of sampling errors in sec-
ond and fourth moments leading to
[
F (θ)
′
F (θ)
]−1
being very close to singular.
Following the bulk of the income covariance literature, I have chosen identity
matrix as the weighting matrix. This approach is called the Equally Weighted
Minimum Distance (EWMD) estimation Chamberlain 1984. Using the iden-
tity matrix as the weighting matrix gives consistent but generally inefficient
estimates.9
The asymptotic standard errors of vector θ are given by the standard covari-
ance matrix based on the fourth moments of the data. That is
Var(θ) = (D′D)−1 D′ΩD (D′D)−1 ,
where D =
∂F (θ)
∂θ′
and Ω = [C− F (θ)]′Q [C− F (θ)] are evaluated at the
solution θ = θˆ. Q is a block diagonal matrix of ones. Including Q in the matrix
product effectively sets the covariances between cohorts zero.
8Initial variance parameters have different interpretation depending on whether the earn-
ings trajectories of cohorts are left-censored. For a cohort which has been 26 years old before
1988, the initial variance is a measure of transitory variance accumulated before 1988, whereas
for a cohort which is observed for the first time after 1988, the initial variance is a measure of
labor market conditions at the time of labor market entry.
9Using the identity matrix as the weighting matrix makes estimation of (10) equivalent to
regressing vector C to vector F (θ) by nonlinear least squares.
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4 Estimation results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Figure 4 decomposes total inequality into its permanent and transitory compo-
nents. The decomposition is based on equation (8). The term p2t
[
σ2α + x
2σ2β + 2xσαβ
]
accounts for the permanent component of earnings and term ρ2var (εibt−1) +
λ2t var (νibt) accounts for the transitory component.
The contribution of permanent earnings inequality to total inequality larger
for men than for women in almost all years. This implies that permanent
inequality among men is larger than among women. The permanent inequality
among men has remained roughly similar except for the recession years 1991
and 1992. Even though the magnitudes of different components are distinct
between sexes, the dynamics of the two components of earnings inequality have
been roughly similar for both sexes for the entire sample period.
The transitory components of earnings inequality of men and women are
highly correlated, albeit transitory inequality is higher for women than for men.
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimates of the parameters of permanent and tran-
sitory components. I discuss both parameters in turn.
A first look at Tables 2 and 3 shows that most parameter estimates have
very small standard errors. That is, they are accurately estimated in spite of the
model being flexibly parameterized and including year, cohort, and experience
effects. Table 2 reports the parameters of permanent earnings differences. The
level term σ2α is statistically significantly larger for men than for women. The
slope term σ2β and the correlation term σαβ are of similar magnitude for both
sexes. Moreover, the estimated correlation between the intercept and slope
terms is positive. This means that people who have higher initial earnings
also have larger earnings growth. As a result, permanent earnings distribution
becomes increasingly unequal over the life cycle.
For men, year loadings on permanent earnings component are almost con-
stant except for the two deepest recession years. For women, there is a downward
trend in yearly loading indicating that the variability in returns to fixed charac-
teristics has decreased during the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. Changes in
year loadings of the permanent component can be interpreted as prices of fixed
characteristics of individuals, keeping cohort effects constant.
Next, I turn to estimates for the cohort loadings on the permanent com-
ponent qc. The most intuitive interpretation for cohort loadings of permanent
component is that they are a measure of the dispersion of skills within a cohort.
An alternative interpretation for qc is that they reflect very persistent shocks
that affect cohorts differently even if the skill dispersion of cohorts does not
change. An example of these shocks is the long-term scar of graduating in a
recession (see, e.g., Kwon et al. 2010, and Oreopoulos & von Wachter 2008).
The deep Finnish recession of early 1990’s is visible as a drop in the per-
manent earnings inequality component.10 The explanation for this drop is that
people with lowest wages dropped out of the workforce, which worked to de-
crease the earnings inequality. The recession is much less visible in the time
series of the transitory shocks.
10Finland experienced the deepest economic recession experienced in any industrialized
country since the 1930s. For details, see, e.g., Gorodnichenko et al. (2009).
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Coinciding with the decrease in yearly factor loadings for women is the in-
crease in cohort loadings of the permanent component of earnings. This implies
that earnings inequality for all women has decreased after the 1990s, but at
the same time, younger cohorts are more unequal than older cohorts. In other
words, as younger cohorts have become more skilled, within cohort inequality
has increased but at the same time between-cohort inequality has decreased. For
men, the inequality time trend is of opposite sign: younger cohorts are more
equal than older.
Finally, I turn to the estimates for the transitory component reported in the
bottom four rows of Table 3. I discuss the parameter of the AR-process first.
The persistence parameter is estimated at 0.22 for men and women. Bottom
three lines in Table 3 give the parameters of age-heteroskedasticity. The age
profile of the variance of transitory shocks, visualized in Figure 5, is strikingly
different between men and women. For men, γ1 and γ2 do not statistically
significantly differ from zero at conventional risk levels, which implies that there
is no age-related heteroskedasticity in variance of transitory shocks. For women,
on the other hand, the variance of transitory shocks is decreasing and convex.
For women under 30, the variance of transitory shocks is over double that of
men. Also, regardless of cohort, initial earnings shocks are considerably higher
for women than for men. This observation is roughly consistent with Lundberg
& Rose (2000), who find that motherhood decreases the supply of labor of those
married women who are attached to the labor market but not their wages.
Year loadings on transitory component of earnings λt also exhibit different
trends for men and women.11 For men, they rise and peak in the year 1994.
Thereafter, they decline somewhat but still remain above one until year 2007.
For women, there is almost a constant rising trend from 1988 to 2007.
Adding cohort loadings to transitory component always resulted in conver-
gence problems. This suggests that cohort effects on the transitory component
over-parameterize the model. Therefore, earnings instability seems to be sym-
metric for all cohorts after accounting for initial conditions. Earnings instability
seems to be more related to labor market conditions prevailing in the society
rather than to differences in human capital within cohorts. Nonetheless, for
both sexes, the contribution of rising earnings instability is substantial. This
gives strong evidence that earnings have become more unstable.
4.2 Decomposition analysis: cohorts and years
The parameter estimates only give a partial clarification on the evolution of
earnings dynamics. As discussed in the previous subsection, there is substasntial
heterogeneity between cohorts and years. The total inequality is a compound
of age, cohort, and year effects. To get further insight on these differences, this
subsection introduces counterfactual analyses which are obtained by eliminating
sets of parameters in turn.
Figure 6 plots the contributions of cohort and year effects on permanent
inequality. For men, setting year effects to 1 eliminates most of the permanent
differences. This is consistent with the fact that male earnings differences are
11To allow the initial variance parameter to be only identified by the initial variance in
cohort’s first sample year, λ1988 is left unrestricted and λ1989 is normalized to 1. Without
this restriction, year loadings on the transitory component and initial variances could not be
jointly identified.
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driven by changes in returns to skill rather than differences in skill composition
of cohorts. The same explanation does not apply for females. Eliminating year
effects in permanent component actually increases female earnings inequality.
The interpretation of this finding is that within-cohort inequality has increased
after 1988 among women.
Turning to transitory earnings differences, we see similar patterns for men
and women. Eliminating year loadings flattens most of the transitory shocks.
This unequivocally suggests that earnings have become more unstable for both
sexes. The slight downward trend in transitory inequality of females is related
to the of the variance of transitory shocks.
The underlying assumption in the preceding discussion is that the model
is correctly specified and all parameters are strongly identified. The following
section discusses evidence speaking in favor of strong identification.
4.3 Sensitivity of results to model specification
A note on the identification of models of second moments of earnings is in order.
Generally, weak identification can arise if the moment condition is small but not
zero at a range of values differing from the true parameter value θ0. Stock &
Wright (2000) show that the asymptotic theory devised for identified models is
invalid for weakly identified models. As a result, parameter estimates of weakly
identified models are inconsistent, and the calculated covariance matrix does
not converge to the true covariance matrix, which results in invalid estimates for
standard errors. Furthermore, even if most parameters are strongly identified,
their asymptotic standard errors might be invalid in the presence of some weakly
identified parameters. In the context of this paper, weak identification may
arise if ρ is close to 1. If ρ ≈ 1, the transitory component is very close to being
permanent. This causes problems in identification, since both the transitory
and the permanent components reflect relatively permanent earnings inequality,
making it difficult to distinguish them from one another, especially, if panel
length is short.
Doris et al. (2012) gives Monte Carlo evidence on the ranges of parameter
values that lead to biased estimates. According to Tables 2a and 3 in their
paper, a model estimated using eight panel years of observations and ρ = .8 is
sufficient to give unbiased results. Since my panel length is well over that for
most cohorts (median panel length in my data is 17 years) and my estimates
of ρ are well below .8, I am confident about the strong identification of the
models estimated. In addition, linear time trends in any factor loading might
also weaken the identification. Such trends are not present in my data.
I have not applied Newey’s (1985) specification test to assess the goodness
of fit because the general finding in earnings dynamics literature is that the null
hypothesis of correctly specified model is virtually always rejected. According
to Baker & Solon (2003), these tests have inflated sizes when the amount of
overidentifying restrictions is as large as in this case (3,066 moment conditions
used to identify 87 parameters).
Another possible caveat, according to warnings in Baker & Solon (2003) and
Shin & Solon (2011), is that an arbitrary change in parametric model may lead
to different conclusions. I have experimented with alternative specifications
(given in Table 4) and do not find a cause for concern. First, as evidenced
by the difference in mean squared errors (MSE’s) between random growth and
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random walk models and the statistically significant estimate of σαβ , data clearly
rejects the simpler random walk specification in favour of the random growth
specification.
Second, the model with an ARMA(1,1) specification for the transitory com-
ponent gives qualitatively similar results to the model with AR(1) specification.
The inclusion of MA(1) parameter, reduces absolute value of the persistence
parameter ρ. Moreover, this difference is statistically significant for women, but
not for men. The inclusion of MA(1) parameter does not have a jointly statis-
tically significant impact for other parameters besides ρ.
5 Comparison to other studies
To better grasp which of the qualitative differences are due to differences in
econometric modeling choices or data and which are due to prevailing isntitu-
tional differences, this section contrasts the central findings of the current paper
to previous studies. Two findings in this paper are qualitatively different from
most previous papers. These are the sign of the correlation between earnings
growth and intercept components, σαβ , and the autocorrelation coefficient of
the transitory earnings component ρ.
My estimate for σαβ is positive for both sexes, which implies that the earn-
ings distribution diverges as people age. Cappellari (2004) reports a similar
finding for Italy, but other studies I am aware of (Haider, 2001; Baker & Solon,
2003; Baker, 1997; Gustavsson, 2008; Ramos, 2003) report a negative parameter
estimate. It is difficult to judge, whether these differences are more due to data
construction or institutional differenes. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the
studies finding σαβ < 0 use various earnings measures as well as data sources.
Since, I do not observe hours worked by an individual, I am not able to
discriminate between full-time and part-time workers. This drives some of the
results. My estimates for the effect of the transitory component are much larger
than those obtained in the studies concentrating only on full time workers (these
include Baker & Solon, 2003; Haider, 2001; Gustavsson, 2008). Moreover, the
persistence of transitory shocks is found to be considerably lower. Baker & Solon
(2003), Dickens (2000), and Haider (2001) report estimated autocorrelation val-
ues in the range of 0.6 and 0.95, but they concentrate on full- time working
males. In contrast, Ramos (2003) does not discriminate between full-time and
part-time workers. He finds that the transitory component may account for up
to 80% of yearly earnings variance. Ramos also finds ρˆ estimates in the range
of 0.29 and 0.41, which are considerably closer to my estimates.
Another partial explanation to the low estimated persistence of transitory
shocks is that, generally speaking, random walk specification results in higher
persistence compared to random growth specifications. Indeed Guvenen (2009),
shows analytically that if a random growth model is misspecified as a random
walk model, the persistence parameter ρ will be biased upwards.
Making comparisons to other countries is somewhat suspect, because sepa-
rating prevailing differences in labor market conditions from differences in data
is far from straightforward. The most comparable study to the current one in
terms of data is Ramos (2003), who studies male earnings inequality in the U.K.
between 1991 and 1999. Most notable difference between the results in Ramos
(2003) and current paper is that Ramos finds that older workers face very unsta-
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ble earnings compared to younger ones. For example, the transitory component
constitutes over 80 per cent of the total income variance for a cohort over 50
years old in the end of the observation period. This is considerably higher than
what I find and is likely attributable to institutional differences (e.g., a higher
proportion of part-time workers over 50 in Great Britain compared to Finland).
6 Summary and conclusions
Previous research has shown that earnings inequality has risen in Finland during
the last two decades. This paper decomposes yearly Finnish log earnings vari-
ance of the working population into its permanent and transitory components..
The analysis is done separately for men and women. The econometric analysis
is based on the second moments of log-earnings using the Equally Weighted
Minimum Distance method of Chamberlain (1984).
I find that the increase in earnings inequality within men as well as within
women is driven by both the permanent and the transitory components but
the contributions of these components are of different magnitude for men and
women. The permanent component of earnings inequality is larger in magnitude
for men than for women. As a corollary, men face more stabile income paths
but with larger permanent earnings differences. Women, on the other hand,
face more unstable earnings profiles but have smaller permanent differences in
earnings.
The age-derivative of permanent earnings inequality of men and women is
similar, indicating that the relative differences in permanent earnings stay sim-
ilar throughout the careers of men and women. The correlation between initial
earnings inequality and the growth in earnings inequality is found to be posi-
tive for both males and female, implying a divergence of earnings profiles and
increasing permanent earnings differences toward the end of the working career.
Compared to findings in other countries the persistence of transitory earnings
shocks is found to be relatively small. Moreover, the contribution of transi-
tory shocks to inequality has risen considerably for both sexes. This strongly
suggests that earnings have become more unstable during the last 20 years.
Finding ultimate causes for changes in persistent and transitory inequality is
beyond the scope of this paper, but some tentative explanations can be devised.
For both sexes, we see that year loadings on the permanent inequality drive a
lot of the earnings differences. This might be due to yearly changes in labour
demand. On the other hand, increasing cohort effects on permanent female
earnings inequality suggest that younger working women face higher permanent
earnings inequality than older women. It seems more plausible that this is due
to high labour force participation of young women rather than changing returns
to skill because there is no such trend for cohorts of men.
Finally, lessons from this paper suggest that researchers applying estimates
obtained from these types of models in their work may inadvertedly miss po-
tentially important aspects of earnings dynamics prevalent in the society if they
only concentrate on males.
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Cohort Years observed Age in initial year Sample size (men) Sample size (women)
1933-1934 1988-1994 55 2 882 3 673
1935-1936 1988-1996 53 5 169 6 579
1937-1938 1988-1998 51 7 383 8 954
1939-1940 1988-2000 49 8 595 9 987
1941-1942 1988-2002 47 10 398 11 736
1943-1944 1988-2004 45 11 593 12 877
1945-1946 1988-2006 43 16 817 18 481
1947-1948 1988-2007 41 18 760 19 801
1949-1950 1988-2007 39 18 026 19 311
1951-1952 1988-2007 37 17 735 18 784
1953-1954 1988-2007 35 17 643 18 982
1955-1956 1988-2007 33 18 377 18 926
1957-1958 1988-2007 31 17 610 17 769
1959-1960 1988-2007 29 18 060 17 562
1961-1962 1988-2007 27 18 447 16 932
1963-1964 1989-2007 26 18 720 16 700
1965-1966 1991-2007 26 17 945 15 930
1967-1968 1993-2007 26 17 688 15 357
1969-1970 1995-2007 26 16 057 13 476
1971-1972 1997-2007 26 15 095 12 209
1973-1974 1999-2007 26 14 248 11 343
1975-1976 2001-2007 26 13 482 9 548
Total 320 729 314 916
Table 1: Cohorts included in the analysis. Note: Age is defined by older of the
two birth cohorts.
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Figure 1: Yearly earnings inequality (measured by variance of log earnings of
workers) of men (solid line) and women (dashed line)
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Figure 2: Autocovariances of yearly log earnings for selected cohorts
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Figure 3: Autocovariances of log yearly earnings for selected years
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Figure 4: Decomposition of the variance of log earnings among men and among
women measured in percentages. Predicted variance is calculated as the sum of
persistent and transitory components
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Men Women
Parameter S.E. Parameter S.E.
p1988 1 1
p1989 1.017 0.010 0.983 0.011
p1990 1.014 0.009 0.944 0.010
p1991 0.737 0.019 0.811 0.009
p1992 0.754 0.019 0.813 0.008
p1993 1.071 0.016 0.913 0.012
p1994 1.102 0.016 0.937 0.009
p1995 1.094 0.018 0.907 0.012
p1996 1.079 0.016 0.908 0.016
p1997 1.063 0.014 0.892 0.015
p1998 1.058 0.017 0.907 0.016
p1999 1.067 0.020 0.898 0.016
p2000 1.054 0.016 0.904 0.013
p2001 1.043 0.014 0.894 0.015
p2002 1.043 0.015 0.893 0.015
p2003 1.063 0.014 0.889 0.012
p2004 1.067 0.013 0.876 0.011
p2005 1.044 0.013 0.855 0.012
p2006 1.028 0.013 0.854 0.013
p2007 1.017 0.015 0.825 0.012
q1933−1934 0.977 0.016 0.777 0.010
q1935−1936 1.054 0.012 0.846 0.007
q1937−1938 1.076 0.009 0.847 0.005
q1939−1940 1.005 0.007 0.876 0.004
q1941−1942 1.049 0.005 0.904 0.003
q1943−1944 1.047 0.004 0.940 0.003
q1945−1946 1.033 0.003 0.938 0.002
q1947−1948 1.034 0.002 0.958 0.001
q1949−1950 1.004 0.001 0.971 0.001
q1951−1952 1 1
q1953−1954 1.000 0.001 1.014 0.001
q1955−1956 1.004 0.002 1.059 0.002
q1957−1958 1.026 0.004 1.097 0.003
q1959−1960 1.010 0.005 1.148 0.005
q1961−1962 1.037 0.007 1.187 0.007
q1963−1964 1.018 0.009 1.192 0.010
q1965−1966 0.992 0.011 1.217 0.012
q1967−1968 0.952 0.013 1.223 0.015
q1969−1970 0.922 0.015 1.267 0.018
q1971−1972 0.907 0.017 1.260 0.023
q1973−1974 0.863 0.020 1.294 0.031
q1975−1976 0.774 0.026 1.129 0.050
σ2a 0.156 0.003 0.093 0.002
σ2b 1.5 ∗ 10−5 8 ∗ 10−6 2.9 ∗ 10−5 6 ∗ 10−6
σab 0.004 2 ∗ 10−4 0.004 1 ∗ 10−4
Table 2: Estimated parameters of permanent component of earnings.
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Men Women
Parameter S.E. Parameter S.E.
λ1988 (unrestricted) (unrestricted)
λ1989 1 1
λ1990 1.057 0.018 1.043 0.019
λ1991 1.279 0.067 1.086 0.024
λ1992 1.380 0.066 1.156 0.024
λ1993 1.384 0.050 1.207 0.028
λ1994 1.487 0.060 1.273 0.031
λ1995 1.413 0.057 1.276 0.032
λ1996 1.395 0.063 1.254 0.036
λ1997 1.349 0.065 1.244 0.037
λ1998 1.366 0.079 1.277 0.039
λ1999 1.335 0.068 1.297 0.043
λ2000 1.331 0.075 1.290 0.047
λ2001 1.290 0.072 1.287 0.047
λ2002 1.288 0.073 1.214 0.051
λ2003 1.243 0.071 1.203 0.062
λ2004 1.239 0.076 1.230 0.057
λ2005 1.253 0.071 1.271 0.054
λ2006 1.312 0.080 1.319 0.050
λ2007 1.302 0.073 1.358 0.045
σ21933−1934 0.025 0.009 0.058 0.005
σ21935−1936 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.004
σ21937−1938 0.067 0.009 0.029 0.004
σ21939−1940 0.054 0.007 0.035 0.004
σ21941−1942 0.097 0.008 0.053 0.004
σ21943−1944 0.101 0.007 0.071 0.004
σ21945−1946 0.109 0.007 0.088 0.004
σ21947−1948 0.132 0.006 0.117 0.004
σ21949−1950 0.123 0.006 0.120 0.003
σ21951−1952 0.128 0.005 0.150 0.003
σ21953−1954 0.113 0.005 0.188 0.003
σ21955−1956 0.106 0.004 0.216 0.003
σ21957−1958 0.103 0.004 0.220 0.003
σ21959−1960 0.117 0.004 0.218 0.003
σ21961−1962 0.135 0.003 0.230 0.002
σ21963−1964 0.141 0.004 0.227 0.004
σ21965−1966 0.210 0.004 0.254 0.002
σ21967−1968 0.323 0.005 0.357 0.002
σ21969−1970 0.281 0.003 0.361 0.002
σ21971−1972 0.246 0.003 0.318 0.003
σ21973−1974 0.255 0.004 0.362 0.004
σ21975−1976 0.205 0.005 0.318 0.007
ρ 0.223 0.012 0.226 0.009
γ0 0.112 0.013 0.249 0.015
γ1 -0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.001
γ2 9 ∗ 10−6 2.7 ∗ 10−5 2 ∗ 10−4 3 ∗ 10−5
Table 3: Estimated parameters of transitory variance of earnings.
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Figure 5: Variance of transitory shocks of men and women as a function of age
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Figure 6: The effects of eliminating year and cohort loadings on permanent
earnings inequality for men and women
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Figure 7: The effects of eliminating year loadings on transitory earnings inequal-
ity for men and women
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